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WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as de-
fendants who had funds to have counsel represent them.21
Along the same line, the Court in Griffin v. Illinois,21 held that
transcripts must be provided if necessary to allow for an adequate,
nondiscriminatory appeal. In the situation where an indigent cannot
afford a transcript, they must be provided by the state.22
In effect, the present case overrules the Breedlove decision. The
United States has limited discrimination in "right to vote" cases to
intelligent use of the ballot. While the Court has condoned reasonable
literacy tests by states, invidious discrimination has been dilineated by
the Court in the present case to include affluence as a prerequisite for
voting. The Harper decision, by renouncing a poll tax of one dollar
and fifty cents per year, leaves no room for doubt that the Court will
not tolerate a burden of any sort on the constitutional rights of citizens.
Michael Lesniak
Constitutional Law-STATUTORY INFERENCES OF CRIMINALITY. In
U. S. v. Romano,' the United States Supreme Court held that the statu-
tory inference of guilt drawn from mere presence was insufficient
evidence to convict for possession, custody and control of an illegal
operating still.
On October 13, 1960 Federal ATTU Agents and Connecticut State
Police conducted a raid on an illegal operating still within an industrial
complex in Jewett City, Connecticut. Respondents, Frank Romano and
John Ottiano, who were found standing a few feet from the still when
the officers entered the building, were arrested and charged with pos-
session, custody and control of an illegal still, illegal production of
distilled spirits and conspiracy to produce distilled spirits. Both were
subsequently tried in the United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut and found guilty on all three courts, receiving three
years imprisonment for each offense to run concurrently, and in addition,
20. Id., at 355.
21. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
22. Id., at 14.
1. 382 U. S. 136 (1965).
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a fine of ten thousand dollars on the possession charge.2 The United
States Court of Appeals affirmed the conspiracy conviction and reversed
the convictions on possession and production.3
The United States Supreme Court, having granted certiorari to re-
view the constitutionality of the inference of criminality under the
statute,4 held that the inference drawn rendered this section invalid and,
therefore, unconstitutional as a violation of the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment.5 This decision basically raises an evidentiary ques-
tion of whether a presumption of guilt may be inferred from mere
presence.
"A rule of presumption is simply a rule changing one of the burdens
of proof, i.e., declaring that the main fact will be inferred or assumed
from some other fact until evidence to the contrary is introduced." 6
Historically, the legal device of a presumption of fact or "inference", as
Dean Wigmore refers to it, has been used by legislatures in an effort to
facilitate the prosecution of certain crimes. Judges have frequently
in civil trials made use of their power to establish such inferences,
2. U. S. v. Romano, 203 F. Supp. 27 (D. Conn. 1962). This decision is in direct
conflict with Barret v. U. S., 322 F. 2d 292 (5th Cir. 1963). In the Barret case under
similar fact conditions the Court held that the statutory inference raised from § 5601 (b)
(1), infra note 4, was not constitutional.
3. U. S. v. Romano, 330 F. 2d 566 (2d Cir. 1964). The appellate court reversed
the lower court's decision on the grounds that the inference drawn violated the de-
fendant's Firth Amendment rights under the due process clause. This decision brought
the Second Circuit in line with the Fifth Circuit's holding in the Barret case, supra
note 2.
4. 26 U. S. C. S 5601 (b) (1) (1959) provides:
Whenever on trial for violation of subsection (a) (1) the defendant is shown
to have been at the site or place where, and at the time when, a still or distilling
apparatus was set up without having been registered, such presence of the de-
fendant shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the
defendant explains such presence to the satisfaction of the jury (or of the court
when tried without jury).
The above section of Title 26 is designed to be applied to § 5601 (a) (1) (1959) which
provides:
That any person who has in his possession or custody, or under his control, any
still or distilling apparatus set up which is not registered, as required by § 5179 (a)
. .. shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years,
or both ....
5. Supra note 1 at 280. Both the United States and the respondents petitioned the
Supreme Court to review only the constitutionality of the inference drawn from
§ 5601 (b) (1).
6. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 1356 (3d Ed. 1940).
7. Chamberlain, Presumptions as First Aid to the District Attorney, 14 A. B. A. J.
287 (1928).
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notably as to facts especially within the knowledge of the person against
whom the inference is made." In criminal trials such inferences are par-
ticularly important to the prosecution where it is necessary to prove the
state of mind or intent of the accused person.9
Basically, there are two methods which legislatures have used to create
these presumptions: (1) where the statute provides what set of facts
will constitute a prima facie case of intent, i.e., the burden is put on the
defendant to show that his act was not done with any criminal intent;
and (2) where the statute makes certain facts prima facie evidence of
the existence of another fact, the existence of which the defendant is
called upon to negate.
The legislatures have entire control over rules of evidence subject
only to the limitations of the rules of evidence expressly enshrined
in the Constitution.10 According to Dean Wigmore it is consistent with
all constitutional protections of accused men to transfer to them the
burden of proving facts peculiarly within their knowledge and hidden
from discovery by the Government." "If the Legislature can abolish
the rules of disqualification of witnesses and grant the rule of discovery
from an opponent, it can shift the burden of producing evidence." 12
The presumption involved in the statutes in question was added by
Congress to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 with the specific pur-
pose of creating a rebuttable presumption of guilt in the case of a person
found at the site of an illegal still.'" The new statutory inferences in
8. Harper v. Highway Motor Freight Lines, Tex. Civ. App., 89 S.W. 2d 448, 449
(1935); Egger v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 203 Wis. 329, 234 N.W. 328, 329
(1931); Thompson v. Southern Michigan Transport Co., 261 Mich. 440, 246 N.W. 174
(1933).
9. Supra note 7 at 287.
10. Supra note 6. For example the Legislature cannot go so far as to indirectly coerce
the accused into taking the stand as a witness against himself in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.
11. 4 Wigmore, op. cit. supra at 2486.
12. Supra note 6. See also, 16 C. J. S., § 269 (b) which states that the Legislature may
establish the requisites of prima facie evidence, and establish, alter, or abolish rules as
to presumptions, as long as it does not make presumptive evidence conclusive and
preclude the adverse party from showing the truth .... It may likewise change existing
rules as to burdens of proof as by shifting the burden of proof from one party to
another.
13. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and Means
on Excise Tax Technical and Administrative Problems, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at
95 (1956). See also Casey v. United States, 276 U. S. 43 (1928); Morrison v. California,
291 U. S. 82 (1934). In the former case, Mr. Justice Holmes discusses Congressional
power to establish a rule of law of presumptive evidence in civil cases, and in the latter
case the opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo deals with statutory presumptions of crimi-
nality in the alien land laws.
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Sections 5601 (b) (1) and 5601 (b) (2)'1 are modeled after Section 4
of the Smuggling Act of 1866.1, Similar wording appears in the Nar-
cotic Drugs Import and Export Act of 1909,16 the constitutionality of
which was sustained in Yee Hem v. United States.17
During the last term of Court in U. S. v. Gainey'8 a presumption of
mere presence at an illegal operating still was held to be sufficient
evidence to maintain a conviction on a charge of carrying on the busi-
ness of a distillery. The United States Supreme Court in upholding this
statutory inference of guilt from mere presence stated that the constitu-
tionality of the legislation was held to depend on the "rationality of the
connection 'between the facts proved and the ultimate fact pre-
sumed." 19 Applying this test in Gainey the Court held that there was
14. 26 U. S. C. § 5601 (b) (2) (1959) provides:
Whenever on trial for violation of subsection (a) (4) the defendant is shown to
have been at the site or place where, and at the time when, the business of a
distiller or rectifier was so engaged in or carried on, such presence of the de-
fendant shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the de-
fendant explains such presence to the satisfaction of the jury (or of the court
when tried without jury).
Note the similarity between this section and § 5601 (b) (1), supra note 4. The above
section of Title 26 is designed to be applied to § 5601 (a) (4) (1959) which provides:
Failure or refusal of distiller or rectifier to give bond.-Any person who carries
on the business of a distiller (emphasis added) or rectifier without having given
bond as required by law.
15. 18 U. S. C. § 545 (1958). This statute deals with smuggling goods into the United
States and provides in part:
Proof of defendant's possession of such goods, unless explained to the satisfaction
of the jury, shall be deemed evidence sufficient to authorize conviction for viola-
tion of this section.
16. 21 U. S. C. § 174 (1958). This statute deals with fraudulently or knowingly im-
porting or bringing into the U. S. any narcotic drug and further provides:
Whenever on trial for a violation of this section the defendant is shown to have
or to have had possession of the narcotic drug, such possession shall be deemed
sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains the
* possession to the satisfaction of the jury.
17. 268 U. S. 178 (1925). This case deals with the importation of opium. The
Court held that the presumptions created in the Narcotic Drugs and Exportation Act,
supra note 16, were reasonable and did not contravene the due process of law and
compulsory self-incrimination clauses of the Fifth Amendment.
18. 380 U. S. 63 (1965). The facts in this case are almost identical to those in
Romnano in that respondent Gainey was merely present at the site of a still when ob-
served by Federal officers. Here the Court held his unexplained presence to be "deemed
in law.sufficient to convict." But see Mr. Justice Blacls dissenting opinion, id. at 76,
and note its similarity to the Romano decision, supra note 1, which was to come a year
later.
19. Id., at 66. The rationality test originated in Tot v. U. S., 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
The case involved the construction and validity of the presumption raised in § 2 (f) of
the Federal Firearms Act, c. 850, 52 Star. 1250, 1251, 15 U. S. C. § 902 (f) (1938) and
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a reasonably sufficient connection between mere presence and carrying
on the business of a distillery and therefore held Section 5601 (b) (2) to
be valid.21 One year later in Romano the Court again applied the
rationality test to a similar set of circumstances, but involving the com-
panion section, 5601 (b) (1). Here they held that the influence did not
meet the test and there was no rational connection between mere
presence and possession, custody and control.
The indication from this decision is that the Court is more emphatically
placing the burden of proof upon the prosecution and in so doing is
destroying a rule of evidence, i.e., the statutory inference or presump-
tion involving intangible possession. It does appear, however, that if the
Gainey case were to arise again it may be decided differently, although
the Court distinguished the two cases by saying that the crime of carrying
on the business of a distillery is narrower in scope than that of posses-
sion, custody and control.21 This seems to be a distinction without
difference. However, it is doubtful that the decision in Romano will
have any significant impact on the role of the prosecution in cases in-
volving possession of tangible goods.22
Bernard A. Gill, Jr.
is significant in that it reaffirms and clarifies the test to be applied to statutory presump-
tions in criminal cases. The Court points out the limits set by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments upon Congress or a State Legislature in malting proof of one fact or group
of facts evidence of the ultimate fact on which guilt is predicated. The Court further
states that such a legislative determination will not be sustained if there is "no rational
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed ......
20. Ibid.
21. U. S. v. Romano, 382 U. S. 136 (1965).
22. For several classic cases involving presumptions where the item possessed is of a
physical nature, see Rosso v. United States, 1 F. 2d 717 (3rd Cir. 1924) (possession
of drugs with foreign label); Morlen v. United States, 13 F. 2d 625 (9th Cir. 1926)
(presumption supporting conviction from possession of narcotics); Pitta v. United
States, 164 F. 2d 601 (9th Cir. 1947) (possession of drugs raises presumption); U. S. v.
Hardgrave, 214 F. 2d 673 (7th Cir. 1954) (possession of sawed-off shotgun supporting
conviction under Firearm Act); Williams v. State, 205 Md. 470, 109 A 2d 89 (1954)
(recent purchase of tools probably used to consummate the crime); Phillips v. State, 157
Neb. 419, 59 N.W. 2d 598 (1953) (possession by one evidence against the other); Wil-
borne v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 63, 28 S.E. 2d 1 (1943) (possession of burglar tools
alone not sufficient but only requires slight additional evidence); State v. Hagerman,
361 Mo. 994, 238 S.W. 2d 327 (1951) (possession of recently stolen goods tended to
show guilt); and State v. Sparks, 40 Mont. 82, 105 Pac. 87 (1909) (with other facts
possession of stolen goods gave rise to presumption of burglary). These cases involving
physical possession seem to be in no danger as they have been distinguished from the
instant case where the possession derives from presence at the site of the object
possessed.
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